Showing posts with label Crisis. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Crisis. Show all posts

Wednesday, June 1, 2016

Risk management for Whales

Tuesday, May 17, 2016

Will there be any benefit for Banks to create highly expensive infrastructure for IMM models

BCBS has recently released consultative document, Reducing variation in credit risk-weighted assets – constraints on the use of internal model approaches. It proposed that banks be barred from using internal models when they calculate how risky certain assets are. Lending to other financial institutions and large companies, and holding equities are the areas most affected.

The proposed changes to the IRB approaches set out in this consultative document include a number of complementary measures that aim to:
1.  Reduce the complexity of the regulatory framework and improve comparability
2. Address excessive variability in the capital requirements for credit risk.

Specifically, the Basel Committee proposes to:
  • Remove the option to use the IRB approaches for certain exposures, where it is judged that the model parameters cannot be estimated sufficiently reliably for regulatory capital purposes 
  • Adopt exposure-level, model-parameter floors to ensure a minimum level of conservatism for portfolios where the IRB approaches remain available 
  • Provide greater specification of parameter estimation practices to reduce variability in risk weighted assets (RWA) for portfolios where the IRB approaches remain available.

Under the proposal, banks will have to use a standardised method of calculating the riskiness of loans to financial institutions and to large corporates with assets of more than €50bn. The Basel group believes there is so much publicly available information on the credit risk of such institutions, that banks are rarely able to provide a better estimate than an approach standardised by regulators.

These proposed regulation are already dubbed as BASEL IV by street. Banks have already spent billions of dollars to comply with the plethora of regulatory changes after the 2008 financial crisis.
Argument is if banks will not be able to use the IMM models for most of the derivative portfolio, as most of the derivative trades happens among financial firms, then how much benefit will banks have in developing highly complex IMM models.

Saturday, September 20, 2014

US interest rate: Potential Shock

A good read by IMF on potential shock for the global market, depends on how and when US will exit from it's unconventional monetary policy.

If US exits bumpy the result could lead to a faster rise in US long-term treasury rates that impacts other bond markets.This could have implications not only for emerging markets, as widely discussed, but, also for other advanced economies.


Friday, September 19, 2014

Full circle of money flow to emerging countries in one year from Aug 2013 to Sep 2014

In August 2013, India faced the worst currency crisis in the wake of US taper tantrum. Indian currency had lost 20.1 percent from beginning 2013 and rupee slumped 3.9 percent to an unprecedented 68.8 per dollar the biggest drop since 1993. The market was in panic mood and RBI and Indian government were trying every thing to stop this mayhem. Some measure like capital control taken by Indian authorities fired back as foreign funds sens that India can freeze their funds or investments. Indian Bond yields was raising and and benchmark government 5Y bond touched the highest yields since 2001.

India has come to long way from August 2013 to August 2014. Rupee is stable and everyone is talking about the Indian growth story in next 5 to 10 years. Mood has completely changed and with corrective measures RBI governor Rajan is well prepared for the further tapering of Fed. Recently ICICI has raised $500m through 5.5 yead bonds, pricing tighter than at it's own funding curve. Money has started flowing back into India and this is the case with almost all emerging countries.

Credit spreads on U.S. dollar-denominated emerging market bonds are back to pre-tantrum levels from early 2013.Bond yields of emerging countries has been tighten and prices are touching all time high. Money is flowing to emerging countries at alarming rate and this is  because of easy monetary policies across the world. There will be a reversal of this money sooner or later but looks like investors are not thinking about that and if this happen suddenly than there could be knee jerk situation again. Indian central bank chief has mentioned his worry on this and he said that we can not reliance on foreign capital, this  money will exit for better use in home countries. Most of the market participants think that this reversal could happen when US do the first rate increase. 
However it is expected that India will be less impacted due to reasons like crude oil is cheaper, high foreign exchange reserve and most importantly India currently has pro business and stable government. 





Sunday, June 22, 2014

Repo and how it related to sub prime crisis

The financial crisis was not caused by homeowners borrowing too much money. It was caused by giant financial institutions borrowing too much money, much of it from each other on the repurchase (repo) market. This matters, because we can't prevent the next crisis by fixing mortgages. We have to fix repos. 
Citi Group's analyst  Matt got this correct in his research report, are the brokers Broken.


"Much of the focus on financials during the credit crunch has been upon writedowns. First on subprime and CDOs of ABS, then on ABCP, ARS and a string of other products, and now on more normal loan portfolios. Investors have been almost obsessive about finding the next ‘shoe to drop’.  Yet from a credit perspective, the major question facing all financials going forward is not one of writedowns but one of funding and leverage. After all, it was the catastrophic loss of funding caused by a sudden evaporation of confidence which led to the demise of both Bear Stearns and Northern Rock, not anything to do with writedowns. The common strand linking those two institutions was their dependence on wholesale markets for funding. And yet their models were not so different from those of many other financial institutions today. The other US broker-dealers, in particular, are funded heavily through short-term repo and secured lending markets, and do not have the diversification implied by a large deposit base. Does this mean that they too are similarly vulnerable?" 
Repos are still not fixed and this market still connects banks , shadow banking entities and still have the power to convert entity or product specific crisis into systematic crisis. some of the latest comments in the news
"Regulators and policymakers currently have no reliable, ongoing information on bilateral repo market activity." -- Financial Stability Oversight Council, May 7, 2014.

"The banks remain dangerously interconnected and vulnerable to sudden runs because of their dependence on short-term, often overnight borrowing through the multitrillion-dollar repurchase agreement, or repo, market. -- Jennifer Taub, associate professor, Vermont Law School, April 4, 2014.

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A detailed explanation about repo and how it was main driver behind the 2008 crisis, About Repo.

Size of the Fed balance sheet

A good read on Fed balance sheet size and asset buying program. 

Lender of last resorts & dealers of last resorts

Be the "Lender of last resorts" in crisis period is a classical advise given by the Walter Bagehot to central banks. Walter mentioned, in 1873, that in time of crisis central banks must lend freely but at high rate.
But as Bagehot pointed out, by lending liberally, central banks make it less likely that their money will be needed. By demanding good collateral, the central bank can try to distinguish insolvent banks from illiquid ones; and by charging a penalty rate of interest, it ensures that it is truly the lender of last resort.

But in sub prime crisis Fed had to be not only the lender of last resort but also "Dealer of last resort" and later it acted as private capital market. 
Below is the snap shot of how balance sheet of Fed changed during the crisis time. Size of balance sheet increased from almost 1 trillion to 2.5 trillion between Jul 2008 to Jan 2010.




Fed responded to crisis initially with selling  off treasury securities and lent out the proceeds through various extended discount facility. After the collapse of Lehman and AIG, money market was almost frozen both domestically and internationally. Banks were not willing to lend each other. Repo collateral haircuts reached to record high and even banks were not accepting the mortgage securities as collateral. In this scenario Fed did even more and shifted much of the wholesale money market onto its own balance sheet. This is referred as Dealer of last resort. 
Once emergency situation was over than Fed replace the temporary loans of various financial sector with permanent ones like mortgage securities.